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The growing popularity of infrastructure-as-a-service cloud
computing, software-defined networking, and related tech-
nologies have enabled the rapid creation of complex, large-
scale distributed systems. Many of these systems are used by
applications with stricter requirements than those covered
by SLAs, such as those used by the financial, healthcare,
and industrial sectors. Mathematical methods exist which
can be used to formally verify many of these safety, live-
ness, and security properties, but are rarely used by system
designers.
In this paper, we identify brittle requirements as one of
the problems which impede the use of formal methods in
distributed system design, and propose a solution based on
the decomposition of a formal model into a user-defined com-
ponent and one or more domain abstractions. This decom-
position enables reusable requirements, which can be shared
across models without requiring redefinition or remapping of
variable bindings. We provide a network-based example of
domain abstraction, and define reusable requirements over
this abstraction in several well-known logics. We concretely
implement model decomposition with VML, a lightweight
modeling language based on labeled transition systems. VML
models can be used to rapidly prototype new distributed
systems by utilizing domain abstractions with reusable re-
quirements. To demonstrate, we create two examples using
imperative and symbolic VML models.
1. INTRODUCTION
The economic success of cloud computing and the bur-
geoning industry of Big Data has led to a profusion of large-
scale mission-critical distributed systems. Many of these
systems are being used for applications in finance, health-
care, and other industries which require iron-glad guaran-
tees with respect to safety, liveness, security, and privacy.
These are currently addressed largely through Service-Level
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Agreements (SLAs), which impose a contractual obligation
to meet specific requirements established by the customer.
SLAs, however, are not proofs that a requirement is al-
ways met. Rather, they are legally binding penalties for
the provider failing to meet that requirement.
For applications where SLAs are insufficient, formal math-
ematical methods exist which can verify (with quantifiable
certainty) that a guarantee holds over a system or service.
These techniques check a set of requirements (expressed as
formulas in one of more logics) over all reachable states of
a model, attempting to discover counter-examples where a
requirement is not met.
Unfortunately, formal verification is rarely used in practice
outside of very high cost-of-failure scenarios like integrated
circuit design. Due to their generally high algorithmic com-
plexity, they are also much more tractable when applied to
simplified models of a system, such as those used in the de-
sign phase.
The rarity of formal verification in the design of distributed
systems is attributed to a number of factors [34, 24]. While
some of these are addressed in recent tools and techniques
[42, 16], we identify brittle requirements as an ongoing prob-
lem which significantly limits the adoption of formal veri-
fication as a system design tool. Generally, formal models
are created in order to check whether certain requirements
in that system’s specification (e.g., availability, consistency,
and safety properties) are indeed met.
These requirements are often inseparable from the model
itself, leading to three forms of brittleness that we have ob-
served: specificity, parameter-varying syntax, and local veri-
fication. These are discussed in Section 2 in more detail, but
all lead to requirements that cannot be shared between mod-
els despite being broadly applicable (e.g., the impossibility
of packet reordering), or are so tightly bound to the model
that minor changes to its implementation necessitate sub-
stantial changes to the requirement syntax. Requirement
brittleness makes incremental or iterative model develop-
ment difficult at best, and often limits the viability of using
formal methods during the design and prototyping phase,
when the system is evolving rapidly. Unfortunately, this
phase is precisely where such techniques would be most use-
ful and tractable.
To address these issues and to make formal verification
more accessible to designers of distributed systems, we present
VML, an extensible modeling language which implements
an abstraction-based mechanism for separating models and
their requirements. Currently, VML provides a Network Do-
main Abstraction that represents a network of concurrent
hosts communicating asynchronously via message-passing.
This simple abstraction is sufficient to enable the expression
of many critical properties of distributed systems, from the
presence of forwarding loops or network blackholes to packet
loss, re-ordering and duplication. In Section 5 we provide
an example list of formally defined, useful properties.1 Any
of these properties can be checked against any VML model
which utilizes their associated domain abstraction, without
any transformation or re-writing to be done.
In the future we intend to extend VML with other Domain
Abstractions, including software-defined networking, repli-
cation, and consistency models. Using these abstractions,
VML enables libraries of re-usable properties to be built
and shared among the research community, independently
of the models being investigated by individual researchers.
VML is a first attempt at a language-based implemen-
tation of a more general model design framework for the
separation of a model and its properties. In this framework,
a model is decomposed into two parts: a series of opaque Do-
main Abstractions which can be modified by the user only
via an exported interface, and the user-written model code.
Done correctly, a large class of interesting properties can be
defined over only the protected Domain Abstractions, which
enables requirement invariance and re-use both across differ-
ent versions of the same model and across entirely different
models. This decomposition resembles the separation of an
operating system into user-space and kernel-space code, and
should embody several of the same characteristics: strict but
movable separation of the two domains, controlled isolation
of the state of the protected domain from changes made by
the user domain, and separate development of user-domain
and protected-domain implementations (i.e., of models, Do-
main Abstractions, and their associated properties).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2
we elaborate on the problems discussed above, which im-
pede the adoption of formal modeling techniques in dis-
tributed system design. In Section 3 we propose a model-
decomposition design framework for formal modeling which
addresses the problems identified in Section 2. In Section
4 we present VML, a language-based implementation of the
model-decomposition technique. In Section 5, we provide
a list of formal properties and corresponding high-level En-
glish descriptions which are useful for formal reasoning about
distributed systems. In Section 6, we model example sys-
tems in VML, and discuss the interaction of the user-generat-
ed model with the network abstraction. We present related
work in Section 7, discuss future work in Section 8, and
conclude in Section 9.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
In this section, we describe the process of formal verifica-
tion and three kinds of brittleness in requirement specifica-
tion that impede its adoption as a design tool for distributed
systems. Each problem is illustrated using implementations
of existing, well-known formal models written for a particu-
lar verification environment.
Formal verification is an automated search for counter-
examples to logically defined requirements over a finite state
1Note that this list is not intended to be exhaustive. The
abstraction restricts only the data elements usable by logical
formulas, not the logic being used or the formula syntax.
space of possible model states. The model is generally writ-
ten by the user in a tool-specific language like Promela [12],
Alloy [15], SAL [35], etc. These languages often serve as a
way to specify instances of particular formalisms, such as
Büchi Automata, Boolean Formulas, or Abstract State Ma-
chines.
Once a model is written, requirements to be checked are
defined using a requirement specification language. In some
tools (e.g., Alloy) this is the same language used to write the
model, while in others (e.g., SPIN) it is separate language
or logic.
The verification tool automatically composes the model
and its requirements to form a state space of possible model
configurations. The space is exhaustively searched for reach-
able states in which one or more requirements fail to hold.
These are then presented to the user.
This approach is lightweight compared to theorem-proving
and proof assistants, in that it requires little initial work and
verification is accomplished quickly, but it sacrifices com-
pleteness. While incomplete verification is problematic when
used to prove that a property holds in all cases, it is quite
useful at the design phase to quickly discard designs where
a requirement demonstrably does not hold.2 More attention
can then be devoted to stronger designs, over which a future
step of theorem-proving may be employed if a higher level
of confidence is necessary.
Unfortunately, the benefits of formal verification are of-
ten outweighed by cumbersome, inflexible modeling and re-
quirement specification languages. We identified three par-
ticular forms of brittleness which cause difficulty in defin-
ing reusable requirements that can be shared across models.
Each is described in detail below, with examples drawn from
models written with the SPIN and PRISM verification tools.
These were chosen due to an abundance of available models,
and relevance to the modeling of distributed systems, but
the issues we discuss are not local to these tools.
Due to the low level of abstraction supported by the ma-
jority of formal modeling languages, requirements must of-
ten be specified in such a way as to be tightly bound to
model syntax and structure. This is problematic if a model
is being developed iteratively, or if a system is being studied
in a variety of configurations, etc. We have observed three
particularly prominent kinds of this brittleness in require-
ments specification:
Specificity. Requirements may be bound to specific, stat-
ically defined model states, array indices, and other hard-
coded values (e.g., local state == 3 ∧ ar[5] == true).
Minor model updates can easily invalidate properties by re-
moving or changing these.
Specificity is particularly prevalent in models based on
communicating state machines [27, 26, 28, 29, 31, 30, 33,
25, 23]. These models are often written in an extremely
low-level syntax, where models are essentially just primi-
tive data elements and a transition function governing valid
updates. Some languages do provide a facility to map un-
bound predicates and atoms to model-specific data. This
allows the logical syntax of a requirement to be re-used over
2The small-scope hypothesis [1] posits that this incomplete-
ness is less problematic than it would first appear. Sig-
nificant empirical evidence indicates that most real-world
bugs (as opposed to maliciously designed flaws) which are
detected in large-scale, time-intensive verification, are also
present at much smaller, more easily verified scales.
related models, but variables and predicates must still be
re-mapped by hand [32, 28, 8].
Parameter-Varying Syntax. Requirements may be de-
fined in such a way that modifying a model parameter (e.g.,
the number of processes in a system) requires the rewriting
of multiple requirements. Many of these rewrites are linear
in the size of the parameter (e.g., p1∧p2∧...∧pn) [32, 27, 26,
28, 29, 31, 20, 17, 36]. Certain properties based on combina-
tions of model elements (e.g., (p1 ∧ p2)∨ (p1 ∧ p3)∨ (p2 ∧ p3)
require substantially more rewriting, however. The require-
ments defined in both [30] and [18] scale quadratically, for
example. We observed that many of these examples exist
due to the necessity of specifying universally or existentially
quantified requirements in unquantified specification logics.
Many instances of parameter-varying syntax can be solved
by writing a pre-processor which consumes a parameterized
version of a model and updates the requirement specification
appropriately. The pre-processor is model-specific, however,
and it is unreasonable to expect a system designer to write
one for every model under development.
Localized Verification. Requirements may be defined
as assertions or predicates which must (not) hold true at
certain regions of model code. Adding new code or modify-
ing those regions may introduce false positives or negatives
when that requirement is verified, or may require model-
refactoring to preserve correctness. Models written in im-
perative languages like Promela [8, 43, 44] most frequently
encounter this problem.
3. MODEL DECOMPOSITION
In this section, we consider how a formal model and re-
quirements to be checked over it can be separated from one
another in order to enable the reuse of requirements across
different models, as well as the automatic binding of these
requirements to a specific model. Our approach relies on
model decomposition, a design technique inspired by oper-
ating systems and the network protocol stack.
As demonstrated in Section 2, formal models are very
tightly coupled to the requirements that are being checked.
This makes sense for application-specific properties which
are meaningful only with respect to that model, but be-
comes problematic when a common high-level property of
a domain (e.g., whether packets are dropped in a network)
must be checked.
We propose to decouple these two aspects of formal verifi-
cation via model decomposition, a design technique in which
a formal model is decomposed into a user-defined compo-
nent and one or more Domain Abstractions (DAs). These
are defined formally below. Informally, DAs syntactically
encapsulate common semantic structures within a given ap-
plication domain. Each DA exposes operations to the user
in the form of new a syntax augmenting the core language,
VML, described in section 4. As an ongoing example, the
Network Abstraction that we define in Section 3.2 allows
formal modeling of those network protocols that can limit
their network interaction to a set of seven operations: send,
receive, forward, copy, link, unlink, and message typing.
Syntactic encapsulation of common semantics enables large
classes of requirements to be defined completely indepen-
dently of the model over which they are being checked, in-
cluding before or after model development. We show in Sec-
tion 5 that the classes of requirement which benefit from






























Figure 1: Domain Abstraction as a narrow waist
variables map only to data elements in the abstraction) are
quite wide-ranging and include many common requirements
of distributed systems.
Done correctly, encapsulation of common structures via
Domain Abstractions can create a narrow-waist in the model
design space. Below this waist, a wide variety of models can
be written using syntax exposed by Domain Abstractions.
Above it, a wide variety of requirements, in any specification
language desired, can be defined against the formal structure
of Domain Abstractions. Any of these requirements can be
checked against any model using the relevant DA.
Furthermore, the design of Domain Abstractions, and the
method by which they are composed with one another, should
acknowledge that the boundary between abstraction and de-
tail is flexible, domain-specific, and prone to change. To this
end, it should be possible to extend the set of abstractions
with refinements, varying levels of detail, and new structures
developed by the application domain’s community. We were
inspired in this design by the modular definition of kernel-
and user-space processes in the operating systems commu-
nity: the core infrastructure should remain minimal and sta-
ble, while permitting new modules and functionalities to be
dynamically loaded or removed from the kernel space.
The Network Abstraction, for example, does not include
the ability to define properties related to hop-count. This
is not because hop-count is difficult to model or a special
case, but simply because many systems will not need it and
should not be forced to model it. Other DAs could certainly
be defined which do include it, and many other interest-
ing properties such as notions of consistency or concurrency
could be encapsulated in Domain Abstractions. System de-
signers should be able to use and compose any number of
these abstractions in order to best support the system under
study.
3.1 Domain Abstractions
Having given an informal description of model decomposi-
tion and Domain Abstractions, we now formally define what
constitutes a DA and the requirements imposed in order to
automate their composition.
Definition 1. A Domain Abstraction is a Labeled Tran-
sition System L = (S,A,→, I), where:
• S is a set of states;
• A is a set of actions;
• → ⊆ S ×A× S is a ternary transition relation;
• I is a set of initial states.
Domain Abstractions are synchronously composed with
an initial LTS defined by the user. In order to facilitate this
composition, one additional requirement is imposed on the
LTS: I and → must be augmented with a stutter transition
which, for all s ∈ S, enables the LTS to remain in the same
state pre- and post-transition. This is necessary to prevent
deadlocks in states where the user-defined model does not
transition using a synchronizing syntax (see below), that
is, when it has only internal state transitions or makes a
transition exposed by another DA.
Domain Abstractions which may be manipulated inter-
actively (i.e., do not consist purely of static data) have a
further requirement: at least one a ∈ A must have an as-
sociated synchronizing syntax, a (possibly parameterized)
language element which is exposed to the core language and
may be included in the user-defined model. The synchroniz-
ing syntax is used to synchronously compose the user-defined
model with the DA: when the former transitions using the
exposed syntax, the latter transitions from the current state
s ∈ S to s′ ∈ S such that ∃a ∈ A, (s, a, s′) ∈ →. If there
exist multiple possible post-states, the choice is made non-
deterministically. Any parameterization of the synchroniz-
ing syntax is treated as a constraint which must hold over
s′. If no s′ exists for the the current state, action, and con-
straint, the system will deadlock.
3.2 The Network Domain Abstraction
In this section, we formally define the network domain
abstraction, or network abstraction. We first present it as a
finite state space with transitions defined as symbolic con-
straints over pre- and post- states, then provide a straight-
forward algorithm to construct a labeled transition system
from the constrained state space.
Definition 2. A network abstraction is defined to be an
8-tuple N = (H,M, T, S, ρ, σ, τ, δ); each component of the
tuple is defined below.
1. H, M , and T are static, finite, non-empty atomic sets.
H denotes the set of hosts, M denotes the set of mes-
sages, and T denotes the set of message types; there
always exists a bottom type ⊥ ∈ T (undefined).
2. S denotes the state space of the abstraction. As ex-
plained below, S ⊆ ρ× σ × τ .
3. ρ : H×H is a binary relation between hosts, such that
(hi, hj) ∈ ρ or ρ(hi, hj) denotes a one-way connection
from hi to hj .
4. σ : M ×H is a binary relation between a message and
a host such that (mi, hi) ∈ σ or σ(mi, hi) denotes the
presence of message mi in the set of received (but not
yet processed) messages at host hi.
5. τ : M × T is a typing function that maps messages to
either a user-defined message type or the bottom type
⊥.
6. δ : S×S is a symbolic transition function defined over
the state space, detailed below.
The cardinality of the sets H,M , and T are user-defined
parameters that, once set, remain constant for the entire
verification process. This fixes a state space S0 ⊆ ρ× σ × τ
where each relation is a set of tuples whose maximum size is
determined by the cardinality of H,M, and T . We further
restrict the state space to all states in which τ is a total
function, that is, in which all messages are typed:
S = {s | s ∈ S0 and ∀m ∈ M, ∃t ∈ T s.t. τ(m, t)}
We define a symbolic transition function δ as the union of
pre- and post-state constraints over the network abstraction.
Each constraint corresponds to an action in the network,
which is represented as a change in the valuations of one or
more relations. For all s, s′ ∈ S (where s, s′ are tuples of the
form ρ× σ× τ and ρ′ × σ′ × τ ′, respectively), the transition
(s, s′) ∈ δ is included if for any of the following constraints,
s satisfies the pre-state constraint and s′ satisfies the post-
state constraint. Note that only the state of the binary
relations may differ in the pre- and post-states. Membership
in the sets H,M, and T does not change.
ORIG
∃hi, hj ∈ H, ρ(hi, hj)
∃m ∈ M, ∀hk ∈ H,¬σ(m,hk)
∃t ∈ T
ρ′ = ρ σ′ = σ ∪ {(m,hj)} τ ′ = τ ∪ {m 7→ t}
(1)
RCV
∃h ∈ H,m ∈ M, t ∈ T s.t. σ(m,h) ∧ τ(m, t)
σ′ = σ − {(m,h)} ρ′ = ρ τ ′ = τ
(2)
FWD
∃hi, hj ∈ H,m ∈ M s.t. σ(m,hi) ∧ ρ(hi, hj)
σ′ = σ − {(m,hi)} ∪ {(m,hj)} ρ′ = ρ τ ′ = τ
(3)
COPY
∃hi, hj ∈ H,m ∈ M s.t. σ(m,hi) ∧ ρ(hi, hj)
σ′ = σ ∪ {(m,hj)} ρ′ = ρ τ ′ = τ
(4)
LINK
∃hi, hj ∈ H s.t. ¬ρ(hi, hj)
σ′ = σ ρ′ = ρ ∪ {(hi, hj)} τ ′ = τ
(5)
UNLINK
∃hi, hj ∈ H s.t. ρ(hi, hj)
σ′ = σ ρ′ = ρ− {(hi, hj)} τ ′ = τ
(6)
RETYPE
∃t ∈ T ∃m ∈ M s.t. ∀h ∈ H,¬σ(m,h)
σ′ = σ ρ′ = ρ τ ′ = τ ∪ {m 7→ t}
(7)
STUTTER
σ′ = σ ρ′ = ρ τ ′ = τ
(8)
Each of the above constraints corresponds to one of the
actions below that can be taken by the network.
• ORIGINATE types and sends a new message to a host
as long as a connection to that host exists.
• RECEIVE removes (processes) a message from the set
of messages in flight to a host.
• FORWARD corresponds to receiving and re-transmitting
a message. Note that this differs from a RECEIVE
followed by an ORIGINATE, as in the former case
no constraint is put on the number of message copies,
while the latter is valid only if no copies of the message
are extant in the network.
• COPY duplicates a message from one host to another,
as long as a connection to that host exists.
• LINK and UNLINK add and remove a connection
between two hosts, respectively.
• RETYPE changes the type of a message, as long as
that message is not currently in flight over the network.
• STUTTER allows the network to remain the same in
its pre- and post-state.
We formally verified the consistency of the above abstrac-
tion in Alloy for multiple cardinalities of H, M , and T , and
confirmed in all cases that all constraints are satisfiable over
state space S.
Theorem 1. It is possible to construct a nondeterminis-
tic labeled transition system LN = (S′, A′,→, I ′) from any
network abstraction N = (H,M, T, S, ρ, σ, τ, δ).
Proof. Construct the restricted state space S as above,
given H, M , and T . Set S′ = S and I ′ = S′. Enumerate
each constraint c that defines δ, and create an associated
action in c ∈ A′. In order to construct →, it is necessary to
identify for each s ∈ S′ every possible post-state s′ ∈ S′ and
create the appropriately labeled transition. An algorithm to
do so is straightforward to define:
for s ∈ S′ do
for each constraint c in the definition of δ do
if s satisfies the pre-condition of c then
for s′ ∈ S′ do
if s′ satisfies the post-condition of c then






The translation of the symbolic transition system to a la-
beled transition system may create a state explosion during
verification due to the number of transitions in →. As will
be shown in Section 4.2, this problem is mitigated by the
synchronous composition of the network abstraction with a
user-defined host model defined using VML.
Table 1 presents the VML syntax for specifying individual
actions that can be taken by the network abstraction. Note
that A denotes the set of all possible actions for a network
abstraction. This syntax is incorporate into the host model
VML syntax described in Section 4.1 and defined in Table 2.
natural n, i, j ∈ N
host h ∈ H
message m ∈ M
message type t ∈ T








set of all actions A ::= {a | a is an action}
Table 1: Network abstraction VML syntax.
4. VML
VML is a lightweight modeling language designed to per-
mit rapid, iterative development of specifications. VML
makes it possible to integrate formal verification into the
design phase of a distributed system
4.1 Host Model Composed with Network Ab-
straction
A host model specifies the behavior of hosts within a net-
work. The VML syntax for specifying the host model is
presented in Table 2. The behavior of a host is modelled as
a finite state space and associated transition function. The
state space represents all possible states of variables (global
and local to each host), the possible positions of control flow
in the host model specification for each host, and all the
possible states of the imported network abstraction; valid
transitions are determined by the semantics of the state-
ments (in terms of control flow, modifications to local and
global variable state, and modifications to the network ab-
straction’s representation of the network state) specified by
the user within each host definition in the host model.
Definition 3. Given an existing network abstraction de-
noted N = (H,M, T, S, ρ, σ, τ, δ) with a set of hosts H =
{h1, . . . , hn} and a set of actions A, a host model is a tuple
H = (P × S, π); the component S is imported from N ; the
components P and π of the tuple are defined below.
1. P = G×Lh1×. . .×Lhn is the set of all possible distinct
states of the collection of hosts:
(a) G is the set of possible states of the collection of
global variables;
(b) Lh1 , . . . , Lhn , where each set Li is the set of pos-
sible states of the local variables and local control
flow in a particular host (each Lh may differ in
structure depending on the VML host definition
corresponding to that host h ∈ H).
2. π is a transition function in (P × S) × A × (P × S);
valid transitions in this function are determined by the
statements in each host definition and the conditions
under which they can be executed:
(a) any update to the position of the control flow
and/or to the local or global variable state from
p ∈ P to p′ ∈ P in a given host definition’s body
does not alter the network abstraction state s ∈ S
and corresponds to the STUTTER action in the
network abstraction:
((p, s), stutter(), (p′, s)) ∈ π;
(b) any update to the network abstraction state from
s ∈ S to s′ ∈ S via an explicit statement invoking
action a in a given host definition’s body corre-
sponds to the appropriate action in the network
abstraction, and it is also necessary to update the
control flow position and (e.g., if a host received a
message and stored it locally in a named variable)
the local variable state from p ∈ P to p′ ∈ P :
((p, s), a, (p′, s′)) ∈ π.
Theorem 2. It is possible to construct a nondeterminis-
tic labeled transition system LH = (S′, A′,→, I ′) from any
host model H = (P × S, π).
Proof. Let A′ = A, let S′ = P × S and I ′ = S′, and let
→ = π.
natural k, n ∈ N
variable x ∈ V
constant c ∈ K
action a ∈ A
net. abs. N
rich ident. y ::= x1 . . . . . xn
| N.H | N.M | N.T
| N.rho | N.tau | N.sigma
| N.link
term e ::= . . . | −1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | . . .
| true | false | y | c | ∗
| e1 && e2 | e1 || e2 | !e
| e1 == e2 | e1 < e2 | e1 <= e2
| −e | e1 + e2 | e1 − e2 | e1 · e2
| | e |
| ( e1 , . . . , en )
| e1 ( e1 , . . . , en )
| { e1 , . . . , en }
branch b ::= e : s1 . . . sn
| else: s1 . . . sn
statement s ::= N.a e
| e1 = e2
| e : s1 . . . sn
| if : b1 . . . bn
| loop : s1 . . . sn
host h ::= host x : s1 . . . sn
import I ::= import N
model M ::= I init: s1 . . . sn h1 . . . hn
Table 2: Host model VML syntax.
4.2 Restriction of Network Domain Abstrac-
tion by the Host Model
Given an instance of a network abstraction N and an in-
stance of a host model H, it is possible to restrict the net-
work abstraction so that its transition relation only contains
transitions permitted by the host model. It is then possible
to interpret any requirement that applies to N as a require-
ment that applies to the composition of N and H.
Definition 4. A restriction of any network abstraction
N = (H,M, T, S, ρ, σ, τ, δ) by a host model H = (P × S, π)
is denoted N|H, and is defined as (H,M, T, S|H, ρ, σ, τ, δ|H)
where:
s ∈ S|H iff ∃p, p′, s′ s.t. ((p, s), a, (p′, s′)) ∈ π
(s, s′) ∈ δ|H iff ∃p, p′ s.t. ((p, s), a, (p′, s′)) ∈ π
Theorem 3. Given any existing network abstraction N =
(H,M, T, S, ρ, σ, τ, δ) and host model H = (P × S, π), any
formula ϕ defining a requirement over a network abstrac-
tion N can be checked over the restricted network abstrac-
tion N|H = (H,M, T, S|H, ρ, σ, τ, δ|H). In other words, if
it is possible to check whether N ` ϕ, then it is possible to
check whether N|H ` ϕ.
Proof. This follows from the fact that S|H ⊆ S and
δ|H ⊆ δ.
5. EXPRESSING FORMAL PROPERTIES OF
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Given a logical system Φ, a property or requirement for
a network abstraction N is a formula ϕ ∈ Φ such that it is
possible to determine using an automated process whether
it is true that N ` ϕ. In this section, we provide examples of
properties which may be defined over Domain Abstractions
and thereby re-used between models. We concentrate on the
Network Domain Abstraction, but the principles presented
here apply equally to any formalism conforming to the def-
inition of Domain Abstraction presented in Section 3.
The ability to express a requirement is dependent on two
factors: the population of available predicates and variables
(what can be checked), and the formal language used to
create formulas over that population (what can be asked).
Domain Abstractions restrict only the former, allowing new
and future languages and logics to express requirements over
existing models. In order to formally verify these require-
ments, of course, a verification tool supporting the given
logic and with a modeling language that an LTS can be
translated to must be available. We are currently develop-
ing translators from VML to Promela, Alloy, and PRISM
(see Section 8).
Domain Abstractions restrict the set of available variables
and predicates by exposing a finite set of atomic variables
or relations, which collectively constitute the internal state
of the abstraction. Any property (regardless of formal lan-
guage used) which can be expressed purely in terms of this
internal state can be separated from individual models. Re-
call that the network abstraction exposes four such relations:
ρ : H × H, σ : M × H, τ : M × T , and → ⊂ S × A × S.
The first three denote links between network hosts, mes-
sages in flight to hosts, and message typings, respectively.
The fourth is the transition relation over the state space S
and set of actions A.
5.1 Sample Requirements
Below, we provide a small sample of requirements which
may be defined over the network abstraction, using First-
Order Logic (FOL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Both
have substantial verification support, and have been used in
the past to reason about distributed systems. These samples
are not intended to be in any way exhaustive, but are merely
intended to serve as examples of the expressive power that
simple abstractions can still provide.
Before continuing, recall that all requirements are being
checked over a finite state space. This allows universal and
existential quantification to be reduced to the simple inter-
section or union, respectively, of all atomic elements in the
set being quantified. [14]. First-Order Logic is therefore re-
ducible to propositional calculus, and may be checked with a
SAT solver. In the case that temporal or other logical quan-
tifiers are also used, FOL sub-formulas may be replaced by
their propositional equivalent (e.g., G(∀x∃y x = y) can be
rewritten as:
G((x0 = y0 ∨ x0 = y1 . . .) ∧ (x1 = y0 ∨ x1 = y1 . . .) ∧ . . .).
5.1.1 First-Order Logic
First-order logic provides universal and existential quan-
tification over sets and relations. This enables the expression
of many useful requirements pertaining to the current state
of a system, especially with respect to models which study
Requirement Formula Logic
Bidirectional-Links ∀h∀h′ ρ(h, h′) → ρ(h′, h) FOL
All-Inflight-Messages-
Are-Broadcast
∀m∃h σ(m,h) → ∀h′ σ(m,h′) FOL
No-Messages-Duplicated ∀m∃h∃h′σ(m,h) ∧ σ(m,h′) → h = h′ FOL
No-Untyped-Messages-
Inflight
∀m∀hσ(m,h) → ¬τ(m,⊥) FOL
One-Outgoing-Link ∀h∃h′∃h′′ ρ(h, h′) ∧ ρ(h, h′′) → h′ = h′′ FOL
Star-Topology ∃h∀h′ ρ(h′, h)∧ρ(h, h′)∧∀h′′ h′′ 6= h → ¬ρ(h′, h′′) FOL
All-Hosts-Reachable ∀h∀h′ ρ+(h, h′) ∨ h = h′ FO(TC)
No-Structural-
Forwarding-Loops
∀h ¬ρ+(h, h) FO(TC)
Ring-Topology All-Hosts-Reachable ∧ One-Outgoing-Link FO(TC)
No-Cycles ∀h ¬ρ+(h, h) FO(TC)
Figure 2: Network Domain Requirements in FOL
and FO(TC).
static snapshots of possible system configurations. Since
there is no explicit notion of time, it is difficult to express
properties relating to the reachability of states.
Note that FOL can be extended with a transitive closure
operation over binary relations, which enables the expres-
sion of reachability predicates. We use X+ to denote the
transitive closure of a binary relation X. This augmenta-
tion is strictly more expressive than FOL, and results in the
logic called Transitive Closure Logic, or FO(TC). Since we
are working in a finite domain, however, FO(TC) remains re-
ducible to a Boolean formula [14]. Figure 5.1.1 presents sam-
ple requirements which can be defined in FOL an FO(TC).
5.1.2 Linear Temporal Logic
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a popular, well-supported
logic for checking concurrency, recurrence, stability, and reach-
ability properties of formal models. LTL is defined over a
single infinite path through through a state-space, i.e., an
infinite sequence of model states. It enables the expression
of temporal properties relating the current and future model
state.
The syntax of LTL consists of the standard propositional
variables, boolean logical operators, and the temporal oper-
ators X G, F , U , R. The first three are unary that operators
bind a formula to the next state, all future states, and some
future state, respectively. The last two are binary operators
which require the first formula to hold true at least until
the second holds true (which must eventually occur), and
require the second formula to hold true until and including
the point at which the first becomes true, respectively. A
full introduction to Linear Temporal Logic can be found in
the literature [13].
Note that in addition to the requirements below, any of
the FOL formulas above can be used with temporal opera-
tors (e.g., GFAll-Hosts-Reachable). This, again, is due to
the reduction of FOL to Propositional Calculus when quan-
tifying over a finite domain. In fact, since the Network Do-
main Abstraction consists purely of relations, this quantifi-
cation is necessary to avoid the use of constants which may
not be defined in all models (e.g., σ(m3, h4)).
The easy expression of recurrence and stability properties
makes LTL particularly useful. Recurrence requirements
take the form GFφ, and state the fact that in all states,
there exists a reachable future state in which φ will be true.
Stability requirements take the form FGφ, and state that
there is some future reachable state after which φ will hold
in all states. Figure 5.1.2 presents Network DA requirements
which can be expressed in LTL.
Requirement Formula
All-Sent-Messages-Eventually-Received G(∀m∃h σ(m,h) → F(¬σ(m,h)))
Host-Disconnects-Once-Messages-Processed (∃h∃h′ρ(h, h′)U∀m¬σ(m,h)
All-Hosts-Eventually-Join F(∀h∃h′ρ(h, h′) ∨ ρ(h′, h))
All-Hosts-Eventually-Leave F(∀h∀h′¬ρ(h, h′) ∧ ¬ρ(h′, h))
No-Logical-Forwarding-Loops G(∀m∃hσ(m,h) → F∀h′¬σ(m,h′))
Figure 3: Network Domain Requirements in LTL.
5.2 Inexpressible Requirements
In this section, we discuss what properties cannot be ex-
pressed in the current Network Domain Abstraction. These
fall into two categories: requirements which use data el-
ements not present in the abstraction, and requirements
which use constants not safely addressable in the abstrac-
tion. The former consists of, e.g., hop count, source and des-
tination address, message reordering, and message dropping.
All of these could be added to the abstraction with minimal
difficulty, and are currently not present in an effort to keep
the DA as minimal as possible. Hop count, source, and desti-
nation address can easily be included as additional relations
with corresponding constraints in the symbolic transition
function. Checking for message dropping can be expressed
in terms of σ and destination address. Message reordering
could be expressed by, for example, creating a partial order-
ing over the σ relation. All of these capabilities can easily
be added to the Domain Abstraction, and may be as part of
our future work.
The second set of inexpressible requirements, those which
use unsafe constants, arises from the parameterization of
the Network DA. Recall that the domain and range of σ, ρ,
and τ are determined by the user-specified cardinality of the
sets H, M , and T . Any formula which binds a variable to a
specific atomic element (e.g., Fσ(m4, h3)) is only syntacti-
cally correct if that element is a member of its respective set
for that model. This prevents generic reuse of such prop-
erties across models. Note that other domain absractions
may safely use constants, as long as the set in question is
invariant across models.
6. VML MODELING EXAMPLES
In this section, we present a two small VML models in
order to demonstrate the capability of our model decom-
position approach. The first, a simple client and server,
demonstrates an imperative modeling style and the use of a
reusable LTL property. The second is a constraint-satisfaction
problem which finds a network topology obeying certain re-
strictions. It demonstrates symbolic modeling and the use
of a reusable FO(TC) property.
We also describe (but do not include) the implementa-
tion of a network of learning switches using the OpenFlow
software-defined networking architecture. This larger model
uses an expanded VML syntax, which builds on the lan-
guage kernel presented here and provides convenience func-
tions such as set comprehension and finite iteration. For
each model, we discuss possible requirements and note those
which can be automatically reused across models (i.e., con-
strain only states in the domain abstraction).
6.1 Simple Client-Server
Figure 6.1 presents a simple client-server model, in which
a client sends requests to a server that receives the request
and then replies with a response. It is intended to illustrate
import network
init:
network.H = {CLIENT, SERVER}
network.M = {M0, M1}













network.originate(M1, RESPONSE, SERVER, CLIENT)













//These hosts can only support limited outgoing connections
|network.rho(3,*)| = 2
|network.rho(1,*)| = 1
//These hosts can only support limited incoming connections
|network.rho(*,1)| = 3
|network.rho(*,7)| = 3
Figure 5: Topology-Finding in VML
basic VML modeling and how the user-defined model inter-
acts with the Network Domain Abstraction (NDA). The ini-
tialization phase constructs an initial NDA state consisting
of two mutually linked hosts and no in-flight messages. All
elements of the sets H, M , and T are explicitly named, and
the relations σ, ρ, and τ begin empty. The host keyword
denotes concurrent processes, which will be composed asyn-
chronously. The loop keyword indicates that the scoped
block will be repeated infinitely. Each process communi-
cates using the NDA’s synchronizing syntax. The client
non-deterministically chooses to send or receive a message
on each iteration.
The client-server model can be checked for deadlocks by
translating the composed LTS to a Büchi automaton and
verifying using SPIN [12] or a related model checker. Using
a Büchi automaton also enables automatic checking of the
All-Sent-Messages-Eventually-Received property (among
others), which is expressed in LTL.
6.2 Model-Finding
The client-server model above demonstrates an imperative
modeling technique, in which a user-defined model explicitly
specifies state transitions. However, it is also possible to
model system state symbolically via constraint satisfaction.
This approach, used by tools like the Alloy Analyzer [15],
allows instances of a model to be found which satisfy (or not)
a set of constraints. This is useful when reasoning about
assumptions and invariants in a distributed system without
needing to model specific protocol states.
Figure 6.2 presents an example in which certain specific
hosts in a network cannot connect to one another, and cer-
tain hosts can only support a limited number of connections.
If the designer wants to find an instance in which both these
constraints and the All-Hosts-Reachable requirement hold,
the model can be symbolically model-checked via translation
to a SAT instance and given to a SAT solver. The result-
ing satisfying valuation can then be translated back to an
instance of the original model [14].
In this model, there are no independent processes to com-
pose with the Network Domain Abstraction. Instead, the
initialization phase is used to constrain the NDA by under-
specifying its state. Since the names of specific state ele-
ments are unimportant, H, M , and T are initialized with
their cardinalities rather than a list of symbolic constants.
The ρ relation is constrained in two ways: by explicitly set-
ting certain pairs of hosts to be disconnected, and by setting
the maximum number of times certain hosts can appear in
the domain or co-domain of the relation. The syntax used
above is shorthand for a cardinality constraint on the set
comprehensions {(h)|∃h′ρ(h, h′)} and {(h)|∃h′ρ(h′, h)}, re-
spectively.
6.3 Software-Defined Networking
For brevity and ease of explanation, the two models above
are necessarily limited in scope and complexity. An ex-
panded VML syntax, however, has been used to model and
formally reason about software-defined networks. In [37], we
modeled an OpenFlow-based network of learning switches
and formally verified safety, stability, and reliability proper-
ties of the network.
OpenFlow [22] networks outsource routing logic to a domain-
specific software controller written by the network designer,
which runs on a remote machine (ranging from commodity
hardware to custom FPGAs) connected to each switch via a
secure channel. OpenFlow-enabled switches send unknown
or unhandled packets to this controller, which responds by
installing flow-rules (next-hop rules which trigger based on
packet headers) in one or more of switches across the net-
work. Compliant switches then route data-plane packets
based on these flow rules.
We created VML-based formal models of OpenFlow switches,
an OpenFlow controller, and mobile end-hosts which non-
deterministically join, send messages to one another, and
leave the network. These were used to model a network of
learning switches with state centralized in the controller.
We defined five requirements over the network, four of
which are written in LTL and one which is written in PCTL*,
a linear- and branching-time logic with probabilistic quan-
tifiers:
1. no-forwarding-loops: Any packet that enters the net-
work will eventually exit the network.
2. no-blackholes: Any packet that is sent will eventually
be received.
3. stable-correct-receiver : If all nodes cease being mobile,
eventually all packets that are received will be received
by the intended recipient.
4. stable-no-floods: If all nodes cease being mobile, even-
tually no more packets will be flooded.
5. bounded-loss-rate: The expected packet loss rate of
mobile nodes is below a specified bound.
Unfortunately, these requirements are not re-usable across
models. We are currently implementing an OpenFlow switch
Domain Abstraction, however, in order to enable re-usability
of these and other useful requirements.
7. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss related work over three dimen-
sions: integration techniques for formal models; requirement
reuse, domain abstraction, and model decomposition; and
formal modeling tools for distributed systems.
VML and composable domain abstractions are intended to
allow integration of multiple domain-specific formal models
into a single formalism, which can be translated to multi-
ple verification tools dependent on the requirements being
verified. Prior work on the integration of formal models has
focused largely on either integrating disparate formal lan-
guages under a common semantics [39, 38, 6, 7, 41], or de-
veloping (semi)automated techniques to transform a formal
model in one language into another [3, 21, 40].
These techniques are complementary to ours: domain ab-
straction enables the composition of multiple models in a
single formalism (labeled transition systems), and benefits
from both allowing more models to be expressed in that for-
malism, and from allowing that formalism to be translated
to different formal languages for verification.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, requirement reuse
has no direct analogue in the research community. The
interface-based compositional approach underlying require-
ment reuse, however, is similar to work in the software en-
gineering community.
Bayley and Zhu [2] formalize design patterns as state-
ments in first-order logic, which can then be composed with
one another and automatically verified with respect to re-
quirements over the software model. This is similar to our
approach of domain abstraction to enable the automatic
composition of domain-specific semantic constructs, which
can then be formally verified with respect to system require-
ments.
Gurov and Huisman [11] present an interface-based com-
positionality framework for reasoning about the safety and
security properties of smartphone applications. Their tech-
nique is based on inlining of private functions to safely trans-
form models into public, composable interfaces between soft-
ware components.
As discussed in Section 8, VML translators are in develop-
ment for multiple formal verification tools. We intend to uti-
lize VML as a common input language for integrating mul-
tiple existing off-the-shelf verification systems into an exten-
sible verification suite. This is similar to the approach taken
by Veritech [10], a translation framework for model descrip-
tions. Veritech uses an intermediate Core Design Language
(CDL) as common basis for translating a model between
several different formal languages. This allows models to
be verified under multiple formalisms, which permits wider
classes of properties to be verified and for smaller, more
tractable verifications by carefully selecting which translator
is most appropriate for a given model and set of specifica-
tions to check. Unlike Veritech, however, VML’s translation
facilities are designed to allow a wide variety of pre-made do-
main abstractions to be composed with a small user-defined
model, and verified with respect to reusable formal proper-
ties.
MODEST [4] and its tool suite MOTOR [5] is an inte-
grated reasoning environment for reactive systems. A model
is written in the MODEST stochastic process algebra, which
is designed to capture a number of functional and non-
functional system properties including safety, liveness, re-
liability, and performance. The MOTOR tool uses a single-
formalism, multi-solution approach: MODEST models are
distilled, based on the property to be checked, into one or
more simpler formalisms that can be formally verified us-
ing any tool whose input language accepts that formalism.
While this enables a larger variety of requirements to be
checked, no facility is provided for the reuse of requirements
over multiple MOTOR models.
CADP [9] is a formal verification suite based on the theory
of concurrent distributed processes. Models are written in
one of several supported process calculi, which enable formal
reasoning about concurrency, dynamic data structures, and
equivalence relations. CADP supports multiple back-end
verification systems, including model checking and equiva-
lence checking. There is no concept in CADP of model de-
composition or reusable requirements, but we are currently
considering implementation of a translator from VML to
CADP in order to combine our reusable requirements with
its substantial verification capabilities.
8. FUTURE WORK
In this section, we discuss future work in two directions:
creating translation algorithms from VML to off-the-shelf
verification tools, and creating new Domain Abstractions
to enable the expression of new reusable requirements for
distributed systems.
With respect to the former direction, we are currently
building translators to Promela [12] (the input language of
the SPIN explicit-state model checker), Alloy [15](a sym-
bolic model-finder), and PRISM [19] (a probabilistic model
checker). SPIN excels at verifying requirements expressible
in LTL, as well as finding deadlock and livelock states. Al-
loy is useful for verifying properties expressible in FO(TC)
and relational calculus. Finally, PRISM can verify proper-
ties written in PCTL*, a superset of linear time logic and
computation tree logic that is augmented with probabilistic
quantifiers. We chose these three tools due to their strong re-
search communities and useful, expressive requirement spec-
ification logics.
In addition to building VML translators, we are also cre-
ating new Domain Abstractions. Software-Defined Network-
ing and Cloud Computing enable flexible, tailor made dis-
tributed systems. These systems must often have strong
gaurentees on performance, reliability, and correctness. To
this end, we are developing a domain abstraction of an Open-
Flow switch that will allow requirements to be formally ver-
ified over software-defined OpenFlow networks. We also in-
tend to create abstractions useful for modeling cloud com-
puting scenarios, including object replication and consis-
tency.
Finally, we intend to create libraries of useful, formally
defined requirements over Domain Abstractions. These re-
usable requirement libraries will allow designers to concen-
trate on modeling their system, and not on formally express-
ing its requirements.
9. CONCLUSION
In this work, we defined a model-decomposition frame-
work which enables reusable requirement specifications for
formal models of distributed systems. These requirements
can be checked against any model written using a partic-
ular Domain Abstraction, without the need to change the
requirements’ syntax or variable bindings. We formally de-
fined Domain Abstractions, showed they can be represented
using Labelled Transition Systems, and proved that any ab-
straction meeting our definition can be composed with other
Domain Abstractions, as well as user-defined models.
To demonstrate this technique we created and formally
specified a Network Domain Abstraction, which can be used
to reason about network topologies and message passing.
We also created a list of sample requirements that can be
used, unchanged, in any model which utilizes the network
domain abstration. Finally, we defined a modeling language,
VML, for writing user-defined models that are automatically
composable with any Domain Abstraction. We provided
examples of imperative and symbolic VML models which
use our Network Domain Abstraction, and discussed what
re-usable requirements can be checked over each example.
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